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Uzbekistan: What changes  
can be expected?
A l e x e y  m A l A s h e n k o
n Tashkent is trying to conduct relations with both its neighbors and outside powers (China, Europe, Russia, and 
the United States) from the position of regional leader. The situation in Central Asia is largely determined by the de-
velopments inside Uzbekistan.
n The existing institutions in Uzbekistan – the presidency, parliament, and political parties – are mainly formal. 
The 1992 Constitution is ostensibly democratic, but the country is really governed by one person: President Karimov. 
However, it would be wrong to describe Uzbekistan’s actual political life as “dying,” given the traditional presence 
of inter-clan rivalry and power struggles in the president’s inner circle, as well as the existence of the illegal Islamist 
opposition. 
n A stable Islamist opposition that includes a multitude of factions appeared in Uzbekistan right after the country 
gained its independence. The Islamists’ main goal is to create a supranational califate in Central Asia with the Fer-
ghana Valley serving as its territorial nucleus. The regime views the religious opposition as the main threat to its 
existence.
n	 Closer ties with Washington against a backdrop of cautious distancing from Moscow is emerging as the leading trend 
in Uzbekistan’s multi-vector foreign policy. The constant search for partnership alternatives to Russia and the desire 
to escape Russia’s guardianship, while not turning down its economic and political support, are evident. Tashkent is 
not planning to participate in Moscow-led international organizations, considering them a threat to its sovereignty. 
n		 Uzbekistan’s key political issue is power succession. The new leader’s risky task of establishing himself will be accom-
panied by the elite’s internal struggle, which will be especially intense, since Uzbekistan lacks a single clan or inter-
est group that is able to impose its will on the entire elite. External actors will not play a particularly significant role 
in the transition of power.
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Uzbekistan sees itself as a regional Central 
Asian power. Indeed, the situation in the region 
is largely determined by Uzbekistan’s domes-
tic situation, and it is precisely from the posi-
tion of regional leader that Tashkent is trying 
to conduct relations with its neighbors as well 
as with outside powers – China, Europe, Russia, 
and the United States. Hence, external interest 
in the country’s internal political situation and 
in the anticipated changes within its ruling elite 
is understandable. The main source of intrigue 
is who will lead the country after its first presi-
dent, Islam Karimov, and no one is able to pre-
dict the outcome. 
The situation in Uzbekistan has two com-
ponents: formal and traditional. Such institu-
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tions as the presidency, parliament, and political 
parties represent formal politics. The Constitu-
tion, adopted in 1992, outwardly appears rea-
sonably democratic, but key decisions are made 
in the presidential administration, or rather by 
Karimov himself, who has been head of state 
since independence was gained as a result 
of the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991. 
The last such decision involved the intro-
duction of amendments to the Constitution by 
the Uzbekistan Senate on December 5, 2011, 
reducing the presidential term from seven to five 
years. Some observers interpreted these amend-
ments as a hint that Karimov would not take 
part in the 2014 presidential election. Others, 
on the contrary, argued that this change provides 
him with a legitimate constitutional framework 
to be elected for another term. The third view 
was that the reduction of the presidential term 
was a hint to the future president to be content 
with a five-year term and not count on remain-
ing head of state virtually for life. 
The reduction of the presidential term can 
also be regarded as a message to the West that 
democracy is allegedly still not alien to Kari-
mov. 1 Indeed, in the speeches of the president 
of Uzbekistan and high-ranking officials, one 
can find many passages concerning respect for 
democratic values and human rights. From time 
to time the Uzbek leadership shows its mercy by 
freeing its opponents from prisons. Usually this 
is done during periods of improvement of re-
lations with the West and on the eve of visits 
by high-ranking Americans. Thus, on the eve 
of the visit by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
in December 2010, human rights activist Nor-
boy Kholhigitov was released, as well as Jamshid 
Karimov, who had been detained for five years 
undergoing compulsory psychiatric treatment. 
In the summer of the same year, poet Yusuf 
Juma was released from the Jaslyk detention 
facility. Karimov himself not only expressed 
his “personal and profound respect,” but also 
declared that he was willing to take significant 
steps in the liberalization of the political system 
in order to “leave this legacy to our children and 
grandchildren.”2
It is entirely obvious though that under 
the current president no significant liberalization 
will take place. The political system has long lost 
its competitiveness, there is no inflow of new 
ideas, and access to information is restricted. 
The opposition’s foreign websites, the Uzbek 
BBC website, and the site of the influential Rus-
sian newspaper, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, which 
publishes materials on Central Asia, are all 
blocked.3 After the Internet was used as a tool 
(albeit not the main one) to overthrow several 
Arab regimes, the government of Uzbekistan 
has been actively monitoring social networks. It 
is difficult to predict to what extent fears about 
the Internet are justified. At the same time, it is 
well known that the Internet did not play a role 
in the 2005 Andijan events, when mass pro-
tests resulted in government troops firing into 
the crowd and causing hundreds of deaths.
In one of the reports of the International 
Crisis Group, the political environment in Uz-
bekistan is described as “deteriorating.”4 Such 
an assessment is justified in relation to the ac-
tivities of local parties, the insignificance 
of the Parliament, and the virtual lack of secu-
lar opposition. However, given the presence 
of the “traditional component” – inter-clan 
rivalry, power struggles in the president’s inner 
circle, and the existence of the illegal Islamist 
opposition – Uzbekistan’s political life cannot 
be seen as “dying.”
There are several clans in Uzbekistan: Sa-
markand (Samarkand-Bukhara), Tashkent, Fer-
ghana, Karakalpakstan, Khorezm, and Surkash 
(which comprises the natives of Surkhandaria 
and Kashkadaria). The Tashkent and Samar-
kand clans are the most powerful in the coun-
try. Depending on who you talk to, Islam Ka-
rimov himself has been said to belong to either 
the former or the latter clan. However, it seems 
that Karimov’s behavior is not determined by 
his affiliation with one of the clans, but by his 
desire from the start to position himself as a na-
tional leader. Karimov had to constantly prove 
his leadership while maintaining the power that 
he inherited as a legacy from the Soviet era.
In the 2000s, Karimov definitively consoli-
dated his position as national leader. The dis-
cussions about which clan the president belongs 
to have largely lost their importance. External 
powers, such as China, Russia, and the United 
States, no longer pay much attention to the clan 
factor. For them it is no longer very important 
which clan the next president of Uzbekistan 
represents.
In the absence of secular opposition, protest 
against the government can only take the form 
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of appeals to Islam. From the very beginning 
of the existence of Uzbekistan as an independent 
state, solid Islamic opposition has emerged com-
prising numerous factions, with Hizb ut-Tahrir 
(HUT) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbeki-
stan (IMU) being among the largest. In addition 
to them, the Akromiya, Adolat Uushmasi, Islam 
Lashkari, Nur, Tovba, Izun Sokol, Ma’rifatchitlar, 
and Takfirshirlar movements are active. Most Is-
lamic organizations are groups with small mem-
berships, or even circles. However, according 
to the opposition leaders, more than 100 thou-
sand of these organizations’ followers are kept 
in prisons.5 This figure is possibly greatly exag-
gerated, but it must be recognized that Islamists 
have a broad social base.
The main goal of Islamists is to create a supra-
national caliphate in Central Asia with the Fer-
ghana Valley serving as its territorial nucleus. In 
essence, the pro-caliphate movement primarily 
stands for struggle against the regime and person-
ally against Islam Karimov, who, in the publica-
tions of HUT and the IMU, is characterized as 
the “devil incarnate,” a supporter of the West and 
Zionism, and also Moscow’s accomplice in restor-
ing the Soviet imperial space. One of the HUT 
leaflets stated that “his soul is full of hatred… 
to Islam …he does not like Islam. He is an infi-
del, who does not recognize Islam.”6 
In practical terms what these factions mostly 
do is disseminate propaganda and attract new 
supporters. HUT’s journals Al-Va’I (Con-
science) and Al-Hadara (Civilization) are dis-
tributed in mosques, at universities, and in pub-
lic transportation. The authorities regularly seize 
hundreds of thousands of leaflets. The content 
of these leaflets, as well as of other publications, 
is primitive, but accessible to ordinary people. 
Egalitarian ideas and social justice are empha-
sized. There are also many references to the Ko-
ran and Hadith. The leaflets are printed in both 
Uzbek and Russian.
Terrorist acts committed by religious ex-
tremists are perceived negatively by people and 
discredit the opposition in their eyes. The most 
well-known was an attempt on President Kari-
mov’s life back in 1999.7 Several terrorist attacks 
occurred in 2004 in Tashkent, the Tashkent 
Oblast, and Bukhara. The Islamic Jihad organi-
zation took responsibility for these acts. A few 
days before the Andijan events of 2005, there 
was a terrorist attack in Khanabad.8 
The fact that even the radical IMU was 
not involved in the events in Khanabad and 
Andijan, as its head, Tohir Yo’ldosh, declared 
immediately after the attacks, is very reveal-
ing. The IMU and its leaders have repeatedly 
emphasized that their party rejects terrorism as 
a way to achieve the organization’s goals.
In terms of its policy toward Islam, the re-
gime is focusing its efforts on two approaches. 
First, it attempts to use Islam as a tool to keep 
the regime in power, and also as a key part 
of the official ideology. Second, it suppresses 
religious opposition. In 1991, Karimov felt 
the power of the Islamists for the first time. 
Since then, he has always feared them, consider-
ing them the main threat to his regime. Struggle 
with the Islamists has become a principle of his 
domestic policy. Karimov’s critics believe that 
the aggressive fight against the Islamic opposi-
tion increases its popularity and that the Islamic 
threat itself is deliberately exaggerated by him.
Islam Karimov has successfully merged na-
tionalism and Islam into an official ideology and 
made it part of the political life of the country. 
However, the question is whether his successor 
will be able to maintain the balance between 
the two. “Whether Uzbekistan remains a sec-
ular state depends upon whether this genera-
tion – and more importantly, subsequent gener-
ations – work out the balance between religion 
and nationalism.”9 
The state of the economy will also have 
an effect on the transition of power. On the one 
hand, the overall economic standing of the coun-
try is generally positive. The national economy 
is diversified. Industry contributes 24 percent 
to the country’s GDP, services – 44 percent, 
and construction – 7 percent, while 18 percent 
of GDP is produced in agriculture (at least 20 
percent of which is represented by the produc-
tion of raw cotton). The World Bank believes 
that Karimov’s government managed to achieve 
macroeconomic stability, restrain inflation by 
It is entirely obvious though that under the current 
president no significant liberalization will take place. 
The political system has long lost its competitiveness, 
there is no inflow of new ideas, and access 
to information is restricted.
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pursuing tight credit and fiscal policy, and grad-
ually reduce the national debt.10  
This economic success was largely due to in-
creased state control. However, it was the very 
same involvement by the government in the 
economy that created barriers to the develop-
ment of a free market, hindered necessary liberal 
economic reforms, and held back the emergence 
of small- and medium-size businesses. Apart from 
that, it also led to the proliferation of corruption. 
As a result, according to the American publica-
tion The Daily Beast, Uzbekistan occupied fifth 
place of 183 countries on the list of the most cor-
rupt states.11 The shadow economy accounts for 
approximately 40-60 percent of its GDP.
Unemployment remains one of the biggest 
problems in Uzbekistan. According to the Min-
istry of Labor and Social Security, in 2012 it 
accounted for 5 percent of the number of em-
ployable people, and the number of unem-
ployed has reached 625.5 thousand.12 In reality, 
unemployment is much higher; the European 
Union estimates it to be as high as 35 percent.13 
It must be noted that more than 1 million 
Uzbek migrant laborers work in Russia every 
year. These workers transfer $4.3 billion to Uz-
bekistan 14 (according to other sources, in 2011 
they transferred $5 billion). Thus, Uzbek Prime 
Minister Shavkat Mirziyayev’s statement that 
every year 1 million jobs are created in the 
country 15 is highly questionable.
Demographics contribute to the increase 
in unemployment. A high birth rate and the con-
stant inflow to cities of young people from rural 
areas lead to a permanent growth in social ten-
sions. It will not be possible to solve these prob-
lems in the near future. A forecast, prepared by 
an international research center with the support 
of the Asian Development Bank and the UN De-
velopment Program, estimates that Uzbekistan’s 
population will reach 33.22 million in 2025, 
7 million of whom will be unemployed.16 
The resolution of these and other prob-
lems will take a long time, stretching over gen-
erations. It is impossible to overcome difficulties 
without external assistance. Therefore, coopera-
tion with foreign partners, first of all with China, 
Russia, and the United States, and recently with 
Europe, especially with Germany, has become 
increasingly important for Uzbekistan.
Uzbekistan’s relations with Russia and 
the United States are full of intrigue, which, 
upon closer examination, has a simple and un-
derstandable explanation. Russia and the United 
States are competitors in the struggle for influence 
in Uzbekistan. Therefore, Uzbekistan’s multi-vec-
tor policy is largely based on the rivalry between 
these two countries. From time to time Tashkent 
either strengthens or diminishes the links with 
one of them. However, the general tendency 
in this balance is toward a closer rapprochement 
with Washington while slowly and carefully dis-
tancing itself from Moscow. The whole twenty-
year history of Uzbekistan, as well as other former 
Soviet republics, is a continual search for part-
ners that would provide an alternative to Russia. 
The former Soviet states want to escape Russia’s 
guardianship, while not turning down its eco-
nomic and political support. 
For Uzbekistan, the shift toward the United 
States began after 9/11. At the time, Karimov 
decided that it was precisely Uzbekistan that 
had become the key partner in the region for 
America in its fight against terrorism. However, 
economic and political dividends from this 
turned out to be less significant than Tashkent 
had expected. The allocated funding proved 
to be much lower, while the Americans contin-
ued to criticize the regime for the absence of de-
mocracy and violations of human rights.
If the events of 9/11 led to a rapproche-
ment between the United States and Uzbeki-
stan, the 2005 violent crackdown on protests 
in Andijan alienated Tashkent from Wash-
ington. Western countries adopted a number 
of sanctions against Uzbekistan, with a ban 
on arms sales in particular. Islam Karimov was 
again subjected to severe criticism. However, 
these measures could not make a significant im-
pact on the Uzbek regime, which did not intend 
to change its domestic policy and had certainly 
no remorse for the methods used to suppress 
the Andijan protest. As world experience shows, 
the effect of sanctions in general is very low. 
Besides, having Russia as an ally, Uzbekistan 
did not have to worry about sanctions at all. 
The World bank believes that karimov’s government 
managed to achieve macroeconomic stability, restrain 
inflation by pursuing tight credit and fiscal policy, and 
gradually reduce the national debt.
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Moscow with few scruples fully accepted Uz-
bekistan’s official version that the uprising had 
been allegedly provoked by local radicals with 
the support of international terrorism. 
Karimov adopted a wait-and-see attitude, 
since he was confident that sooner or later his 
actions would be forgotten and sanctions would 
be eased and eventually dropped altogether. 
Time showed that he had chosen the right tac-
tics. Relatively quickly the Andijan drama be-
came history, eclipsed by other events in Kyrgyz-
stan and the Middle East. The main factor that 
changed the approach to Uzbekistan was Barack 
Obama’s decision to withdraw U.S. troops from 
Afghanistan in 2014. This necessitated inevi-
table adjustments to the U.S. policy in Central 
Asia, making it subordinate to the main Afghan 
goal and requiring a more careful attitude to-
ward U.S. partners in the region.
On September 22, 2012, the U.S. Congress 
agreed to resume arms supplies to Uzbekistan, 
lifting the ban introduced in 2004. A delegation 
led by Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus made 
a visit to Tashkent in order to determine what 
kind of weapons Uzbekistan needs. The so-called 
“Mabus list” was drawn up, which included mine 
clearing, night vision, terrain scanning, and eaves-
dropping devices, as well as equipment making 
it possible to control the Internet and break into 
social networks. All these munitions and tech-
nologies have a dual purpose.17 In light of the fact 
that in the foreseeable future Uzbekistan will 
most likely not be confronted with Taliban ag-
gression, the U.S. weapons that it expects to get 
are needed primarily for the regime’s internal pur-
poses; moreover, they are for the fight not only 
against armed Islamic radicals but also against any 
discontent and dissent. Finally, they can be used 
on Uzbekistan’s borders with its neighbors.
Karimov’s desire to obtain weapons from 
the United States is a demonstration to Moscow 
that Uzbekistan can do without Russian arms. 
Supplying weapons remains one of the ways 
of binding Uzbekistan to Russia. Karimov is 
more than frank about this situation. In 2009, 
at a meeting in Tashkent with U.S. Deputy Sec-
retary of State William Burns and then Advisor 
to the President on Russia and Eurasia Michael 
McFaul (who was later appointed U.S. Ambas-
sador to Russia), Karimov argued, for example, 
that the Collective Security Treaty Organiza-
tion (CSTO) was created as a counterweight 
to NATO. The CSTO, he emphasized, has three 
goals: to promote Russian domination in the 
post-Soviet space; to provide multinational 
protection in case of Russian attacks on such 
problematic countries as Georgia and Ukraine; 
and to deploy Russian troops in Central Asia 
on a permanent basis. Karimov even suggested 
that the attack on Andijan was a signal to force 
Uzbekistan to join the Collective Rapid Reac-
tion Force (CRRF),18 which had been created 
within the framework of the CSTO.
The United States repeatedly advised Uzbeki-
stan to withdraw from the CSTO, declaring its 
willingness to provide it with military and techni-
cal assistance in return. However, Karimov con-
tinued to maneuver and did not let the American 
vector in his foreign policy work to the detriment 
of the Russian one. In 2012, a new stage in the 
development of relations with the United States 
began. Whether it may be considered a strate-
gic turn, only time will tell. However, there are 
circumstances in favor of that very conclusion. 
First, after the withdrawal of American troops 
from Afghanistan in 2014, Tashkent is count-
ing on finally becoming the main partner in the 
region for the United States. Second, there are 
concerns in Uzbekistan over Russia’s activity 
in the region, whose aim is the creation under its 
auspices of international organizations that could 
limit the sovereignty of their participants. 
The Arab Spring, which resulted in Islamists 
coming to power in several Muslim states, con-
tributed to the improvement of relations be-
tween Uzbekistan and the United States. Wash-
ington needs reliable partners in the Muslim 
world as never before, and Uzbekistan is posi-
tioning itself as such a partner. Moreover, it has 
been able to convince the United States of its 
sustainability and has shown itself to be stron-
ger than the authoritarian regimes in Egypt, 
Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen. It is also important 
that hypothetically the alternative to the Uzbek 
regime is seen to be not moderate Islamism as 
in Turkey but rather religious radicalism. 
At the same time, while making its choice 
in favor of the United States, Uzbekistan does 
not intend to cut off its relations with Russia. 
Karimov has managed to get Moscow accus-
tomed to changes in its policy, paying no atten-
tion to Moscow’s displeasure. It must be noted 
that this irritation has been expressed by low-
ranking Russian politicians, who only rarely 
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make comments on the escapades of the Uzbek 
top leadership, which are unpleasant for them, 
while Karimov criticizes Russia sharply and 
quite frequently.
Against the background of intense political 
passions, Uzbek-Russian economic relations 
are developing in a relatively positive way. Ac-
cording to the trade missions of both coun-
tries, the trade turnover between them reached 
$6.7 billion in 2011, which made Russia Uz-
bekistan’s top trading partner. In 2011 it ac-
counted for almost a quarter of the country’s 
overall trade turnover.19 Uzbekistan occupies 
fourth place among Russia’s CIS partners.
Uzbekistan supplies natural gas, automobiles, 
and textiles to Russia. Gazprom purchases 13.5 
billion cubic meters of gas annually.20 Soyuzneft-
egaz, Lukoil, and Transneftegaz also have projects 
in Uzbekistan.21 Lukoil is actively engaged in the 
Khauzak natural gas field, the projected capacity 
of which is estimated at 12 billion cubic meters. 
Lukoil plans to invest $5.5 billion in the Uzbek 
economy over the course of seven years.22 
Political relations between Tashkent and 
Moscow are becoming more and more complex. 
At the same time, it seems that both sides have 
become accustomed to this situation. Tash-
kent tries to build relations with Russia strictly 
on a bilateral basis, considering participation 
in international organizations created under 
the auspices of Moscow a threat to its sover-
eignty. Uzbekistan does not want to bind itself 
with any other commitments. While the CIS 
is considered an inevitable and useless vestige 
of the post-Soviet era, the CSTO is perceived 
by Tashkent with suspicion. On the other hand, 
the CSTO is of no use to Uzbekistan.
In the summer of 2012, Tashkent once again 
declared that it would suspend its membership 
in the CSTO. Given that the CSTO’s Charter 
does not provide for such a procedure, it means 
that Uzbekistan will withdraw. This decision 
was not unexpected, since even earlier Uzbeki-
stan expressed its disagreement with a whole 
number of CSTO decisions. In particular, it did 
not agree with committing its troops in order 
to resolve internal conflicts in member states 
and, therefore, Tashkent ref used to participate 
in the CRRF. Finally, Tashkent did not sign 
the agreement under which a military base 
of a third country can be built on the territory 
of a CSTO member only if approved by all 
members of the organization.
Moscow’s reaction to Tashkent’s decision 
to withdraw from the CSTO was rather mod-
erate. Apparently, the Kremlin, as mentioned 
earlier, has already become accustomed to its 
ally’s unstable behavior, or it came to the con-
clusion that the CSTO can do without Uzbeki-
stan. Moscow is beginning to understand that 
its recurrent attempts to pull Uzbekistan into 
the CSTO will make Moscow look like a sup-
pliant. At the same time, the situation high-
lights the CSTO’s problems and makes other 
members more critical of the organization. 
It was highly symbolic that the decision 
to leave the CSTO was made just a few weeks 
after Vladimir Putin’s visit to Tashkent. The aim 
of Putin’s visit was to engage Uzbekistan in Rus-
sia’s new integration projects. There were even 
rumors, initiated by Moscow, that Uzbekistan 
was interested in joining the Common Eco-
nomic Space. However, the withdrawal from 
the CSTO unequivocally showed not only that 
Tashkent will continue to give priority to build-
ing relations on a bilateral basis  but also that it is 
increasingly orienting itself toward the West. 
The key issue of Uzbekistan’s internal and thus 
its foreign policy at the beginning of the 2010s 
is the issue of succession. The personification 
of power is typical for all Central Asian states. 
Whoever succeeds Islam Karimov will have to ful-
fill the role of national leader and bear personal 
responsibility for the situation in the country. 
The option of turning Uzbekistan into a parlia-
mentary republic as has been done in Kyrgyzstan 
is not feasible. Even if such a system is suddenly 
formed, it will only serve as a cover for inter-clan 
struggles (the very idea of a parliamentary re-
public has to a large extent been discredited by 
the Kyrgyz experience). The Uzbek regime will 
remain authoritarian. Its head will not enjoy au-
thority equal to that of Islam Karimov. In the eyes 
of the elites and society, he will likely appear as 
a provisional president representing a compro-
mise between various Uzbek clans. The new 
leader will have to walk down a risky path to es-
Whoever succeeds Islam karimov will have to fulfill 
the role of national leader and bear personal 
responsibility for the situation in the country.
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tablish himself and prove his right to leadership. 
This will be accompanied by a struggle within 
the elite, which can affect the situation in the so-
ciety at large. Uzbekistan has neither a clan nor 
an interest group capable of imposing its will 
on the political elite or becoming the only sup-
port for the new president. 
The influence of external actors on the tran-
sition of power will not be very significant. 
Neither China, nor the United States, and still 
less Russia have their own preferred candidates. 
Beijing, Washington, and Moscow will ac-
cept whomever the local elites present to them 
(regardless of whether he is “appointed” by Is-
lam Karimov or determined by the consensus 
of the local elites). Apart from that, they do not 
have serious plans to change the nature of the re-
gime. The West recognizes that liberalization can 
contribute to the strengthening of the Islamists. 
As for Russia, any authoritarian regime is easier 
for it to deal with than something more lib-
eral (Russian criticism of the political situation 
in Kyrgyzstan testifies to this). 
The new leader will develop the main stra-
tegic directions that were set by Karimov and 
continue the multi-vector foreign policy, but 
with even greater focus on the West, specifi-
cally on the United States. In case the transition 
of power is soft, Uzbekistan might experience 
a brief period of limited liberalization. This will 
represent another gesture toward Europe and 
the United States.
The decline of Russian influence will en-
dure and will be accompanied by assurances 
of friendship and cooperation, especially in the 
economy. There certainly aren’t any unambigu-
ously pro-Russian politicians in Uzbekistan any 
more, and they are unlikely to appear. 
The future of relations between Uzbekistan 
and Muslim countries will be intriguing. Tash-
kent will have to take into account the coming 
of Islamists into power in several countries and 
the general increase of the impact of the Is-
lamic factor on international politics. One can-
not exclude the possibility that in that context 
the government will have to modify its approach 
to the Islamist opposition, making it more prag-
matic and recognizing the existence of a “mod-
erate wing” within it. 
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